This study aims to investigate whether the presence of a subsidiary banking representative on a borrowing company's directors' board affects the level of accounting conservatism in its financial statements. This study also explores the effectiveness of the lender control mechanism in reducing the imbalance of information between the borrowing company and long-term creditors (lenders). Consequently, lenders will decrease their desire for control offered by conservatism. Meanwhile, the model proposed by Basu (1997) was used to measure conservatism by examining the asymmetric timing of profits. Three measures devised by critics of accounting were employed to assess the level of control exerted by bankers on the board of directors (variable control). First: LaFond and Watts (2008) "measures of the characteristics of the company associated with the conservatism ratio of market value to book, leverage, litigation risk, and size of the company". Second: Ahmed and Duellman (2007) "measures of corporate governance characteristics associated with conservatism, including board independence, board size, separation of CEO and chairman roles, average external directors, internal director ownership, external director ownership, and institutional ownership." Third, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Gilson (1990) "factors associated with the likelihood of having commercial bankers on corporate boards, such as stock return volatility, equity return volatility box, tangible assets, trade credit ratings, capital structure, bankruptcy risk, and industry membership." The findings demonstrate that the lender control mechanism effectively addresses the issue of information asymmetry, thereby mitigating the debt agency problem. Consequently, a conservative approach significantly reduces lenders' need for monitoring. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that companies that have a member from the banking industry on their board of directors exhibit a lower level of accounting conservatism compared to companies without any banking representation on their board. Academic research suggests that lending relationships can have a similar impact on conservatism. This means that when lenders have more control, conservatism tends to decline.